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THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION AND ADJUDICATION 
Stephen E. Gent* 
INTRODUCTION 
Disputing states may select from a variety of resolution 
mechanisms to manage their conflicts—bilateral negotiations, non-
binding third-party mediation,1 or international arbitration and 
adjudication.2 Of these mechanisms, arbitration and adjudication 
have often proven to be the most effective means of producing long-
lasting settlements on contentious issues. Despite this fact, evidence 
indicates that states are generally reluctant to use such legal forms of 
dispute resolution, especially in resolving issues of national security. 
To understand when policymakers can and should promote the use 
of these mechanisms, they need to understand the reasons behind the 
reluctance of states to use arbitral or legal forums. Recent research 
provides insight into the political dynamics underlying the use of 
                                                 
*  Stephen E. Gent, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 
1 See Kyle Beardsley, Using the Right Tool for the Job: Leverage and Conflict 
Resolution, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 57 (2013); Scott Sigmund Gartner, Deceptive 
Results: Why Mediation Appears to Fail but Actually Succeeds, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L 
AFF. 27 (2013); J. Michael Greig, Intractable Syria? Insights from the Scholarly Literature 
on the Failure of Mediation, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 48 (2013); Molly M. Melin, 
When States Mediate, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 78 (2013); Isak Svensson, Research 
on Bias in Mediation: Policy Implications, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 17 (2013). 
2 U.N. Charter art. 33, para. 1. 
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international arbitration and adjudication—insights that will aid 
policymakers charged with resolving such disputes.3 
International arbitration and adjudication share three general 
characteristics. First, a third party, not the disputants, determines the 
terms of any settlement.4 Second, unlike mediation, states agree to 
honor the ruling before the third party actually hands down a 
decision. Finally, the arbitration or adjudication settlements 
incorporate principles of international law that are not necessarily 
invoked in other types of negotiations.5 The two methods primarily 
differ with respect to the identity of the third party.6 In arbitration, an 
individual, state, NGO, or panel of states hands down a decision. On 
the other hand, adjudication is conducted by an international court, 
such as the International Court of Justice. 
While arbitration and adjudication are often viewed as legal 
instruments, it is important to view the use of such procedures as 
being part of a political process. In disputes over contentious issues, 
states are primarily interested in achieving outcomes that protect their 
                                                 
3 See generally Krista E. Wiegand & Emilia Justyna Powell, Past Experience, 
Quest for the Best Forum, and Peaceful Attempts to Resolve Territorial Disputes, 55 J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 33 (2011); Stephen E. Gent & Megan Shannon, Decision Control 
and the Pursuit of Binding Conflict Management: Choosing the Ties that Bind, 55 J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 710 (2011); Stephen E. Gent & Megan Shannon, Bias and the 
Effectiveness of Third-Party Conflict Management Mechanisms, 28 CONFLICT MGMT. & 
PEACE SCI. 124 (2011); Stephen E. Gent & Megan Shannon, The Effectiveness of 
International Arbitration and Adjudication: Getting into a Bind, 72 J. POL. 366 (2010); 
Richard B. Bilder, Adjudication: International Arbitration Tribunals and Courts, in 
PEACEMAKING IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: METHODS AND TECHNIQUES 195-
266 (I. William Zartman ed., U.S. Institute of Peace Press rev. ed. 2007); Sara 
McLaughlin Mitchell & Paul R. Hensel, International Institutions, and Compliance with 
Agreements, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 721 (2007); Todd L. Allee, & Paul K. Huth, 
Legitimizing Dispute Settlement: International Legal Rulings as Domestic Political Cover, 100 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 219, 219-234 (2006); Beth Simmons, Capacity, Commitment, and 
Compliance: International Institutions and Territorial Disputes, 46 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 829 
(2002) (describing recent studies in political science on legal dispute resolution of 
territorial and maritime issues).  
4 Franz Cede, The Settlement of International Disputes by Legal Means—
Arbitration and Judicial Settlement, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION 358-59 (Jacob Bercovitch et al. eds., 2009).  
5 Id. at 360. 
6 See id. at 358-75. 
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own security and economic interests. Thus, even though decisions of 
arbitration panels or international courts are largely based on legal 
principles, the initial decision to pursue arbitration or adjudication 
represents a voluntary, political commitment. The tension inherent in 
the use of a legal procedure to resolve a political dispute has often 
constrained the use of arbitration and adjudication in the 
international system.7 This article examines how the political frame 
helps policymakers understand when and why states would be willing 
to use international arbitration to resolve disputes over contentious 
issues. 
I. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ARBITRATION AND 
ADJUDICATION 
Despite a tendency to compare these processes legally to their 
domestic counterparts, international arbitration and adjudication are 
carried out in a different environment. Without a global police force, 
international courts and arbitration panels do not have the same 
ability to enforce legal rulings as domestic governments. 
Nevertheless, international arbitration and adjudication have proved 
remarkably effective. Studies have shown that these legal dispute 
mechanisms are significantly more successful at resolving 
international territorial, maritime, and river disputes than other 
bilateral and third-party conflict management mechanisms.8 Table 1 
presents historical data on the outcome of attempts to settle 
territorial claims in the Americas and Western Europe collected by 
the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) project.9 Sixty-three percent of 
the time, arbitration or adjudication ends the claim between the 
                                                 
7 JOSEPH PRESTON BARATTA, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: 
IMPROVING ITS ROLE IN DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 26 (1989). See generally F.S. 
NORTHEDGE & MICHAEL D. DONELAN, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES: THE 
POLITICAL ASPECTS (1971). 
8 See Gent & Shannon, The Effectiveness of International Arbitration and 
Adjudication: Getting into a Bind, supra note 3, at 368-69; Gent & Shannon, Bias and the 
Effectiveness of Third-Party Conflict Management Mechanisms, supra note 3, at 127-28.  
9 See generally Paul R. Hensel, Contentious Issues and World Politics: The 
Management of Territorial Claims in the Americas, 1816-1992, 45 INT’L STUD. Q. 81 
(2001); PAUL R. HENSEL & SARA MCLAUGHLN MITCHELL, THE ISSUE 
CORRELATES OF WAR (ICOW) PROJECT, http://www.paulhensel.org/icow.html. 
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disputants. On the other hand, bilateral negotiations and mediation 
have a success rate of less than twenty percent. What drives this 
remarkable difference in success rates? 
Table 1. Effectiveness of Different Conflict Resolution 







    

























Source: Issue Correlates of War; includes all territorial claims in the Americas and 
Western Europe, 1816-2001. Percentages in parentheses. 
There are several reasons why states are often willing to 
comply with international arbitration and adjudication despite the 
lack of traditional law enforcement. First, arbitrators and adjudicators 
usually use principles of international law as the basis for their 
decisions. Thus, when a state rejects such a ruling, it is also rejecting 
well-established legal code. States may respect legal rulings in order to 
help preserve the general legitimacy of international law. Second, the 
legality of arbitration and adjudication generates international 
reputation costs. These rulings are perceived by the rest of the world 
as being legitimate because they are founded in legal provisions 
agreed to by the global community.10 Thus it can damage a country’s 
                                                 
10 See generally Dana D. Fischer, Decisions to Use the International Court of 
Justice: Four Recent Cases. 26 INT’L STUD. Q. 251(1982). 
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reputation when it chooses to break a binding agreement.11 Finally, 
arbitration and adjudication can provide political cover at the 
domestic level. Domestic constituents and voters may perceive 
concessions based on international law as being more legitimate than 
concessions offered in bilateral negotiations.12 Thus, the arbitral and 
adjudicative settlements may be more acceptable to a country’s 
population, and disparate constituencies within the country, in the 
long term than other types of settlements. 
II. THE RELUCTANCE TO USE LEGAL DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION 
While arbitration and adjudication have proven to be highly 
effective at resolving disputes, states are reluctant to use these 
procedures. Table 2 presents data on the frequency of different types 
of settlement attempts of territorial, maritime, and river claims. 
Arbitration and adjudication combined only make up about six or 
seven percent of settlement attempts. To understand why methods of 
international legal dispute resolution are rarely used, one must 
consider the unique characteristics of these procedures. Unlike 
bilateral negotiations or other types of third-party diplomatic efforts, 
arbitration and adjudication require states to give up decision control. 
Decision control is the “degree to which any one of the participants 
may unilaterally determine the outcome of the dispute.”13 In binding 
arbitration or adjudication, an international court or arbitration panel 
makes the final determination about the terms of any settlement. 
  
                                                 
11 See Mitchell & Hensel, supra note 3, at 723-25; Simmons, supra note 3, 
at 843-44. 
12 See Allee & Huth, supra note 3, at 222-23; Kyle Beardsley & Nigel Lo, 
Third-Party Conflict Management and the Willingness to Make Concessions, 57 J. CONFLICT 
RESOL. (forthcoming 2013); THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY 
AMONG NATIONS 61-62 (1990).  
13 John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CALIF. L. 
REV. 541, 546 (1978). 
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Table 2. Conflict Resolution Attempts by Type  
and Disputed Issue 
Source: Issue Correlates of War project. Percentages in parentheses. 
 
The requirement that disputants relinquish decision control 
makes them reluctant to pursue legal dispute resolution. When 
deciding whether to pursue legal dispute resolution, states must 
weigh the trade-off between pursuing an effective conflict 
management strategy and the costs of ceding decision control to a 
third party.14 The following five factors significantly influence the 
willingness of states to relinquish decision control and pursue 
arbitration or adjudication: 
                                                 
14 Gent & Shannon, The Effectiveness of International Arbitration and 
Adjudication: Getting into a Bind, supra note 3, at 368-69.  
 Type of Disputed Issue 
     
Type of Conflict Resolution 
Attempt Territory River Maritime 
Total 
Attempts 
     
Arbitration/Adjudication 38 7 16 61 
 (7.2) (4.9) (6.0) (6.5) 
     
Other Third-Party 
Attempt 144 48 89 281 
 (27.2) (33.3) (3.5) (29.9) 
     
Bilateral Negotiations 348 89 161 598 
 (65.7) (61.8) (60.5) (63.6) 
     
Total Attempts 530 144 266 940 
 (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) 
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A.  Third-Party Bias 
Each party to a dispute will be reluctant to give up decision 
control to an arbitration panel or court that it believes is biased 
against its interests.15 A state may expect that such a biased third 
party will hand down a ruling that disproportionately favors its 
adversary. Given that one of the disputants would likely reject any 
biased third party, disputants are generally only willing to jointly agree 
to relatively unbiased arbiters or adjudicators.16 
B.  Salience 
States are less willing to cede decision control when 
negotiating over highly salient issues.17 An unfavorable ruling on an 
issue of critical importance would be very costly, as state leaders 
would be faced with the choice between living with an unpalatable 
outcome and bearing the costs of reneging on a legal settlement.18 
Given this, it is not surprising that arbitration and adjudication are 
more commonly used to resolve less salient economic issues such as 
investment disputes than more salient security issues like territorial 
control.19 Moreover, within the universe of territorial and maritime 
claims, states have been less willing to pursue arbitration or 
adjudication on highly salient claims, such as those that involve 
strategically located territory or valuable resources.20 For example, 
despite the fact that Colombia and Venezuela have previously used 
arbitration to resolve a territorial dispute, they have been reluctant to 
do so over their disputed maritime boundary in Gulf of Venezuela 
                                                 
15 Id. at 375.  
16 Id.  
17 Gent & Shannon, Bias and the Effectiveness of Third-Party Conflict 
Management Mechanisms, supra note 3, at 134.  
18 Id. at 129.  
19 See Gent & Shannon, Decision Control and the Pursuit of Binding Conflict 
Management: Choosing the Ties that Bind, supra note 3, at 730 n.2. See generally Todd 
Allee & Clint Peinhardt, Delegating Differences: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Bargaining 
Over Dispute Resolution Provisions, 54 INT’L STUD. Q. 124 (2010) (discussing the use of 
arbitration to resolve investment disputes). 
20 See Gent & Shannon, Bias and the Effectiveness of Third-Party Conflict 
Management Mechanisms, supra note 3, at 138.  
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after the discovery of oil reserves in the 1960s.21 Similarly, while 
Malaysia was willing to use the International Tribunal of the Law of 
the Seas to resolve a maritime dispute with Singapore over land 
reclamation in 2003, it recently avoided arbitration or adjudication to 
resolve a disputed claim with Brunei over the rights to offshore oil 
reserves.22 
C.  Uncertainty 
Uncertainty about potential legal rulings also influences the 
willingness to pursue arbitration or adjudication.23 A state will be less 
inclined to give up decision control if it is highly uncertain as to the 
terms of the settlement that it should expect from arbitration or 
adjudication.24 As the nineteenth-century international law scholar 
John Bassett Moore noted, “Governments are not in the habit of 
resigning their functions so completely into the hands of arbitrators 
as to say, ‘We have no boundaries; make some for us.’”25 Given this, 
disputants generally only agree to pursue arbitration or adjudication 
after they have successfully reached previous functional, procedural, 
and substantive agreements on the issue at hand that decrease the 
range of outcomes that could result from legal dispute resolution.26 
D.  Bargaining Power 
The decision to pursue arbitration or adjudication is part of a 
bargaining process between disputants.27 On issues of national 
security, such as territorial conflicts, a state’s bargaining power is 
                                                 
21 Gent & Shannon, Decision Control and the Pursuit of Binding Conflict 
Management: Choosing the Ties that Bind, supra note 3, at 714. 
22 Press Release, Permanent Court of Arbitration, Case Concerning Land 
Reclamation by Singapore In and Around the Straits of Johor (Jan. 14, 2005), 
http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1154.  
23 Gent & Shannon, Decision Control and the Pursuit of Binding Conflict 
Management: Choosing the Ties that Bind, supra note 3, at 720.  
24 Id.  
25 LARS SCHOULTZ, BENEATH THE UNITED STATES: A HISTORY OF U.S. 
POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA 117 (1998).  
26 Gent & Shannon, Decision Control and the Pursuit of Binding Conflict 
Management: Choosing the Ties that Bind, supra note 3, at 721. 
27 Id. 
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largely a function of its ability and willingness to pursue its goals 
through military force.28 However, once states enter into arbitration 
or adjudication, this source of power is no longer salient, as the terms 
of any settlement will instead be a function of the strength of each 
state’s legal claim.29 Since states with greater capabilities are better 
able to guarantee favorable outcomes through negotiations or 
military conflicts, they will be reluctant to opt for legal dispute 
resolution unless they expect to receive a favorable ruling.30 For this 
reason, arbitration and adjudication are less likely when there is a 
large power asymmetry between disputants. 
E.  Armed Conflict 
In general, the costs involved with the militarization of 
conflict increase the incentive of states to resolve their disputed 
claims. Thus, it is not surprising that arbitration and adjudication of 
territorial, maritime, and river claims are more likely when there has 
been a militarized interstate dispute on the issue in recent years.31 
However, legal dispute resolution is rarely used as part of the peace 
process of an armed conflict.32 In these situations, there is often a 
lack of trust between the disputants that would be necessary for an 
effective legal procedure.33 In addition, peace processes usually 
revolve around multidimensional issues. Thus, disputants are 
generally reluctant to give up decision control to a legal body during 
peace negotiations because it reduces their ability to use issue linkage 
to find a politically acceptable compromise solution to the conflict. 
III. MOVING RELUCTANT STATES TO THE ARBITRAL 
FORUM 
Systematic analysis has shown that arbitration and 
adjudication can be highly effective methods of resolving contentious 
                                                 
28 Id. at 719. 
29 Id. at 719-20. 
30 Id. at 719. 
31 Id. at 727.   
32 Id. at 713.  
33 See Gent & Shannon, The Effectiveness of International Arbitration and 
Adjudication: Getting into a Bind, supra note 3, at 367.  
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international disputes, but states are often unwilling to pursue such 
legal procedures. Looking at the choice to pursue arbitration or 
adjudication as a political decision provides policymakers with 
concrete strategies to encourage the use of legal dispute resolution. In 
particular, policymakers should focus on reducing the costs of giving 
up decision control without undermining the unique benefits of 
international arbitration and adjudication. 
First, policymakers should find the historical shift from 
arbitration by states to arbitration and adjudication by 
intergovernmental organizations and courts to be a positive trend. 
Disputants will likely perceive such organizations and courts as being 
less biased than state actors, which will decrease the potential costs of 
giving up decision control. For this reason, policymakers should 
encourage the use of international courts and instill confidence in the 
international community that such courts are unbiased. One practical 
step would be to ensure that the methods used by international 
courts to select judges for individual cases minimize the possibility of 
a biased judge, such as a citizen of one of the disputing states.34 
Second, policymakers can help minimize the costs of giving 
up decision control by reducing the stakes and the level of 
uncertainty in arbitration and adjudication. One potential approach to 
doing this would be to encourage disputants to use incremental or 
piecemeal binding negotiations to settle portions of their claim.35 
Submitting to arbitration rulings over a series of smaller issues poses 
less of a risk to disputants than a comprehensive ruling, as it provides 
the ability to back out at various stages. While such an approach 
would extend the negotiation process, if it encourages states that 
would not otherwise do so to enter into a legal dispute resolution 
procedure, it may prove to be a more effective long-term conflict 
resolution strategy. 
Finally, it is also important to emphasize legal dispute 
resolution is not a panacea for all conflicts. States have multiple 
                                                 
34 Eric A. Posner & Miguel F.P. de Figueiredo, Is the International Court of 
Justice Biased?, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 599, 624 (2005). 
35 See Larry N. George, Realism and Internationalism in the Gulf of Venezuela, 
30 J. INTERAMERICAN STUD. & WORLD AFF. 139, 162 (1988). 
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avenues—from bilateral negotiations to non-binding mediation to 
military conflict—to reach settlements over disputed issues.36 When 
disputants opt for arbitration or adjudication, they must forgo these 
other options. Since states with greater bargaining power are able to 
guarantee themselves favorable outcomes outside of court, they will 
be reluctant to submit their claims to arbitration or adjudication 
unless they can expect a similarly favorable outcome. In the maritime 
dispute with Brunei, Malaysian leaders recognized that they had a 
weak legal claim and had little chance of a favorable outcome if the 
case was submitted to arbitration or adjudication.37 Instead, Malaysia 
opted for bilateral negotiations in which it was able to use leverage 
and issue linkage to guarantee itself a future share of the oil and gas 
revenues in the disputed maritime area.38 
As mentioned above, a similar desire for flexibility and the 
need to find compromises over complex, multidimensional issues 
also makes states reluctant to give up decision control to a legal body 
during peace negotiations of armed conflicts. The limitations of the 
use of legal dispute resolution to resolve armed conflict were 
apparent in the aftermath of the 2000 Algiers Agreement to end the 
war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, in which the disputants agreed to 
allow the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) to demarcate their 
border and arbitrate claims of international law violations.39 Ethiopia 
rejected the arbitral decision that awarded the disputed border town 
of Badme to Eritrea,40 and the reparations awarded by the PCA were 
insufficient to resolve the political dispute between the states.41 Given 
this, policymakers should focus on more flexible conflict 
management mechanisms, such as mediation, that allow states to 
maintain decision control in the immediate aftermath of armed 
                                                 
36 See Gent & Shannon, The Effectiveness of International Arbitration and 
Adjudication: Getting into a Bind, supra note 3, at 372.  




39 Ari Dybnis, Note, Was the Eritrea—Ethiopia Claims Commission Merely a 
Zero-Sum Game?: Exposing the Limits of Arbitration in Resolving Violent Transnational 
Conflict, 33 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 255, 259, 263 (2011).  
40 Id. at 263. 
41 Id. at 270-71. 
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conflict, reserving arbitration and adjudication for situations in which 
there is a reduced level of tension between the disputants. 
In addition, evidence from territorial disputes indicates that 
states are less likely to comply with legal rulings that do not reflect 
the underlying balance of power between the disputants.42 For 
example, a militarily superior Argentina rejected a 1977 arbitration 
settlement of its disputed border with Chile in Beagle Channel.43 
Given its power advantage, the Argentine government found the 
arbitration ruling unacceptable and hoped to achieve a more 
favorable outcome through other means.44 Thus, arbitration and 
adjudication will be most effective when they produce settlements 
that reflect the political realities on the ground. Understanding these 
political factors can help policymakers determine when they should 
promote the use of arbitration and adjudication, as well as when they 
should turn to alternative methods of conflict management. 
 
                                                 
42 See STEPHEN E. GENT & MEGAN SHANNON, BARGAINING POWER 
AND THE USE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND ADJUDICATION 15-16 (Mar. 
13, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with International Studies Association). 
This version of this paper was presented at the 2011 annual meeting of the 
International Studies Association in Montreal, Canada (Mar. 16-19, 2011). 
43 See DAVID R. MARES, VIOLENT PEACE: MILITARIZED INTERSTATE 
BARGAINING IN LATIN AMERICA 136-37 (2001). 
44 See id. at 137-38.  
